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The analysis of how the European Union (EU) affects domestic political competition and
political parties has mainly been centred on elections, whereas studies on parliaments
have focused more on institutional adaptation. However, parliaments also provide
forums for debating alternative domestic and EU policies. This study examines how
Europe is used in parliamentary competition in Italy and Spain by analysing party dis-
courses in investiture and budget debates. Covering two decades (1986–2006), the
study investigates whether or not the EU has gained importance over time in the way
parties use European policies, the evolution of party positions towards the EU and,
more generally, the consequences of integration for party policies and discourse.
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Introduction
The impact of the European Union (EU) on domestic politics has been studied in
different and complementary ways. Regarding political parties and political com-
petition, the analyses have normally been centred on the electoral arena, while
studies on parliaments have focused mainly on institutional adaptation. Analys-
ing how parties compete in the parliamentary arena can hence provide new
insights into the way the EU and its policies are interiorised at the domestic level.
Without denying the importance of elections, parliamentary competition pro-
vides, in a certain way, a far more realistic, clear and constant position of political
parties. It is more realistic because parties have to present and explain specific
policies, to defend their ideas and position on issues that are sometimes imposs-
ible to downplay. Equally, as the debates almost always include a final vote,
parties have to explain the direction of their vote in a clear way. Finally, this pos-
ition has to be sustained over a certain period of time, being therefore more con-
stant. Consequently, the analysis of the parliamentary arena provides different
insights on how parties and their leaders react to, interiorise and use Europe in
domestic political competition. Moreover, it can help to overcome some of the
problems that arise if we focus on the electoral arena. Notably, three main pro-
blems are important: declared salience, because parties emphasise positive and
cohesive issues during elections; dissent, which is minimised within the party
during campaigns; and timing, as elections are held only every four or five
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years, which is especially relevant in a time-sensitive issue such as European inte-
gration (Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen, & Bakker, 2007).
This study analyses the importance and usages parties make of the European
context and its policies in parliamentary investiture and budget debates. The
former presents the government programme for the legislature, while the latter
concerns what is probably the most important law approved by the parliament
each year and makes reference to economic policy. Both debates have a very
high salience in public opinion and the media. A comparative research design
is used by analysing Italy and Spain, and 13 parties over a broad time period
(1986–2006), allowing a synchronic and diachronic analysis and a wide range
of cases for analysing parties’ usage of Europe.1
The next section contains a brief account of the notion of usage, after which
case selection and methodology are dealt with. Following this, the empirical
analysis will be done in two steps, the first focusing on the importance of
Europe in both types of debate and the second on the usages of Europe. The
final section discusses the findings.
Political Competition, Parties and the EU: New Insights from a Different
Perspective
The notion of usage is crucial for the analysis in this study and can be defined as
‘practices and political interactions which adjust and redefine themselves by
seizing the European Union as a set of opportunities, be they institutional, ideo-
logical, political or organisational’ (Jacquot & Woll, 2003, p. 4). Usage has to be
intentional because ‘whatever might be the nature of specific opportunity . . .
actors need to seize them in order to transform them into political practices.
The whole process of transforming resources or constraints into political prac-
tices constitutes a usage’ (2003, p. 4). As a result, ‘political usage describes
the mediation done by an actor to transform a material or immaterial resource
provided by the European institutions into a political action’ (2003, p. 6).
Furthermore, this approach considers that the EU and its policies have differ-
ent consequences depending on domestic context and institutional factors. This is
a key difference: the context is not exogenous but rather endogenous, where
parties may have different perceptions on the consequences of specific European
issues (Garrett, 1998; Hay & Rosamond, 2002; Hay & Smith, 2005). Institutional,
economic, social and cultural factors play a role in the conceptualisation of Euro-
pean opportunities and constraints. That is why ‘there is no single unifying dis-
course of globalisation and/or European integration; rather such notions are
appealed to in different ways in different contexts. This highlights the need to
map and compare the appeals to discourses of globalisation and European inte-
gration in different national settings’ (Hay & Smith, 2005, p. 125). Thus, Euro-
pean integration cannot be considered as an objective and uncontested
exogenous process.
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Based on this definition and the different interpretation and perception of
opportunities and constraints offered by the European context, some possible
usages of Europe have been selected. Europe can be conceptualised as an incen-
tive or constraint for action, for legitimising some policy options, for evaluating
some EU policies positively or negatively or simply for using Europe as a frame
of reference to compare policy performance. Equally, and as EU policies are not
ideologically neutral, different parties with different ideologies, in government or
in opposition, may use Europe and its policies in different ways and, so, the poli-
ticisation of Europe and its policies can play a significant role in parliamentary
competition.
One final aspect deals with how European integration may affect domestic
party systems. On the one hand, direct impacts assume that domestic party
systems change as a result of EU pressure, creating a new cleavage and thus
new parties. However, in this sense, European integration has had little if any
impact (Mair, 2000). On the other hand, scholars have also recognised the impor-
tance of indirect impacts, that is, a more subtle way by which the EU may affect
domestic political competition, such as the reduction of policy decidability or the
disempowerment of elections and voters as many of the issues discussed at the
national level have already been agreed upon at the European level (Bartolini,
2005; Mair, 2000). The analysis of the usages of Europe can help to track
down some of these indirect impacts.
From this discussion and from previous research we can argue that the inter-
iorisation of the EU depends on different, although interrelated, factors, such as
government/opposition status, the nature of the party system and domestic clea-
vages, and party ideology or position towards European integration. We can thus
elaborate the following hypotheses:
H1: Owing to the deepening of European integration between 1986 and
2000, the EU’s importance and relevance in domestic debates should
increase over time.
H2: Domestic political and economic contexts affect the way European
opportunities and constraints are perceived. In countries with more
stable governments or high economic growth, the EU should be less con-
tested than in countries with governmental crisis or non-existent growth.
H3: Governing parties present more positive usages than parties in oppo-
sition. In turn, opposition parties can present negative accounts of Euro-
pean policies and use the EU as another tool for criticising the government.
H4: Larger parties with vote-seeking strategies use the EU in a more posi-
tive way than smaller and policy-seeking parties. Furthermore, in mainly
pro-European countries, larger parties tend to be pro-European whereas
smaller ones present more critical positions on integration.
H5: The EU’s specific processes or policies can open new structures of
opportunity in domestic political competition. In this sense, the indirect
impacts of the EU gain importance.
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Case Selection and Methodology
Four aspects are especially relevant in this analysis: country, parties, debates, and
time span. Regarding country selection, Italy and Spain joined the EU in different
periods and some scholars agree that the longer a country is an EU member, the
more Europeanised it should be (see, for example, Pennings, 2006). They are the
two biggest southern European countries, with broadly similar European interests
and where Europe has been traditionally conceptualised as an opportunity for
modernisation. The countries differ regarding economic performance, with
Spain considered a more successful country whereas Italy experienced a period
of low or non-existent growth during the period of analysis.2 Their party
systems are different, with diverse institutional settings, dynamics and effective
number of parties. To cover the broadest examples, 13 parties have been selected,
including both government and opposition parties, vote- and policy-seeking
parties and parties with different ideological profiles and positions towards inte-
gration (Table 1). Whereas in Spain there are only one-party governments, in
Italy governments are formed by electoral coalitions that also include, as a
rule, Eurosceptic parties.
Two debates are analysed, investiture and budget debates. Owing to their rel-
evance, interventions are usually made by the party leader. For this analysis, the
first intervention of each party’s representative has been selected and, in the
Italian case, the vote declarations of the most prominent political leaders. Each
intervention comprises the unit of analysis and has been codified following a
specific codebook that includes different variables (see later). Owing to the
purpose of this study, the time span is also relevant. As I want to study the evol-
ution and interiorisation of the EU and its policies, the Maastricht Treaty is con-
sidered as a critical juncture in European integration. Hence, the selection of
Table 1: The Selection of Parties and Parliamentary Debates
Parties Italy Spain
Left Rifondazione Communista (RC) Izquierda Unida (IU)
Centre-left Democratici di Sinistra (DS) Partido Socialista Obrero Español
(PSOE)
Centre Democrazia Cristiana (DC), La
Margherita
Centre-right Forza Italia (FI) Partido Popular (PP)
Right Alleanza Nazionale (AN)
Ethno-regionalist Lega Nord (LN) Convergència i Unió (CIU), Partido
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)
Parliamentary debates (number of debates analysed)
Investiture debates
(years)
91 (1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000,
2004)
30 (1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992,




108 (Yearly from 1990 to 2006) 80 (Yearly from 1990 to 2006)
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investiture debates starts in 1986 for Spain and 1987 for Italy, while the analysed
budget debates cover a period from 1990 to 2006.
This leads to the final aspect regarding methodology. A specific codebook has
been built to track down different usages of Europe in domestic debates. On the
one hand, it provides structural information (party, year, government status, party
family). On the other hand, the following specific variables and usages were
selected: (a) importance of Europe, that is, if Europe is important or not in
each intervention; (b) impact of Europe on domestic politics, where specific
EU policy outcomes can be considered as opportunities (with positive domestic
consequences), constraints (with negative ones), mixed accounts, and no refer-
ences (no mentions or usages are made); (c) domestic action, implying that
the European context and debates can be conceived as incentives (for helping
to foster domestic action), constraints (representing different limitations for dom-
estic political action), mixed accounts, or no references; (d) legitimation, with or
without mention of Europe, that legitimises political action (or inaction) or that
shows the importance of implementing a certain policy; and finally (e) evaluation
of European policies, where leaders evaluate EU policies as either positive (stres-
sing the benefits of certain EU policies for the country), or negative (emphasising
the negative impacts of EU policies for domestic interests), use mixed accounts or
make no references.
The Importance of Europe in Investiture and Budget Debates
The first step of the analysis starts with the importance of Europe in the debates.
Figure 1 provides data on the relevance of Europe in domestic debates highlighting
Figure 1: Importance of Europe in Investiture and Budget Debates
Note: All the data, in this and the following figures, present the percentage of interventions that are
included in each category.
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certain variables: the difference between countries and debates, the relevance of
governmental status and the importance of the timing of European integration.
We can observe the varying importance of Europe depending on the country
and the debates. Even though Italy joined the EU long before Spain, Europe is,
generally speaking, more important in the latter, especially regarding investiture
debates (Europe is important in 40 per cent of the Spanish interventions but only
in 18 per cent in Italy). Meanwhile, the importance in budget debates is similar in
both countries (25 per cent and 24 per cent for Spain and Italy, respectively).
What explains this huge difference regarding investiture debates? The key
factor is governmental strength and stability, because Europe and its policies
are much more relevant in debates held after elections than in those held in the
middle of the legislature, after a governmental crisis. Spain is characterised by
strong governments whereas Italy, with its weakly institutionalised parties and
electoral coalitions (a de facto two-party system), has less cohesive parties and
less stable governments. Consequently, those investiture debates held after a gov-
ernmental crisis, which normally include new governmental coalitions, are
focused on the new government’s legitimacy. In Berlusconi’s (1998) own
words, in the investiture debate of the 1998 centre-left government led by
D’Alema: ‘a government that is born not from the votes but from the fear of
the vote, does not have democratic legitimacy, and can be defined just as the
usual cheat.’3 The tendency for opposition parties is thus to focus on domestic
factors and to downplay the importance of specific policies. In this case, the rel-
evance of the EU disappears (0 per cent of interventions where Europe is
important).
The incentives are different, however, for the new government. As shown by
the data, the importance of Europe in government interventions is higher in this
situation, rising to 35 per cent, 11 per cent higher than the mean importance of the
EU in these debates. Contrary to opposition parties, cabinet parties use the EU for
legitimising their incumbency. As D’Alema (1998) (Democratici di Sinistra
[DS]) claimed in his programmatic declaration in the 1998 investiture debate:
I have never thought that the alternative advocated with strength by the
opposition of Polo della Libertà, to call new elections, was acceptable . . .
But in the current Italian situation it is not convenient. Not because of
formal prejudices, but for concrete and substantial reasons, starting with
a fundamental one: new elections, as it is known, would have prevented
approving a new budget law . . . with negative repercussions not just on
our country’s image and credit but also, in a period in which the introduc-
tion of the euro is approaching, for the concrete interests of millions of Ita-
lians. This fundamental worry . . . has pushed for an alternative and
political solution, as an act of responsibility towards our country and its
interests. (D’Alema, 1998, p. 7)
This leads directly to governmental status, which is the second important factor
for explaining the role of the EU. Governing parties in both countries and in both
34 THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES
debates accord Europe a higher importance than opposition parties. On the one
hand, European integration is relevant as an issue per se. As Felipe González
(1993) claimed in his 1993 investiture debate:
the programmatic offer that I present is centred along four main axes: the
first one, to overcome the economic crisis and to drive forward the
economy; the second, the democratic impulse; the third, regional develop-
ment; the fourth, foreign policy and the impulse towards the European
Union. (González, 1993, p. 2)
This issue is common to all governmental parties, as the EU will be a relevant
aspect of their work. Furthermore, the EU is used for justifying their domestic
actions, because they play a key role at the European level, while opposition
parties are less active and less well-represented in key European institutions,
making their strategy and discourse more nationally based.
The data also show the importance of timing. The period under analysis
includes the discussion, adoption and implementation of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) (1990–93, 1994–97 and 1998–2001, respectively) as well as the
adoption of the euro (2002). During the adoption period (1994–97), the reforms
needed for adapting to the Maastricht criteria necessitated unpopular decisions.
Thus, we should expect a high importance of Europe during EMU’s implemen-
tation. As Figure 1 shows, the importance of Europe in budget debates is indeed
higher in 1994–97 (60 per cent in Spain and 28 per cent in Italy). EMU played a
key role, especially for government parties, as they had to implement difficult pol-
icies, resulting not only from European opportunities but also from constraints, in a
short period of time. Spain and Italy differ in the importance attributed to Europe
after the introduction of the euro. While the EU’s saliency sharply declined in
Spain (10 per cent importance in 2002–5), in Italy its importance was sustained
over time and even increased in the last period, almost to the levels of 1994–97.
What explains this divergence? As argued above, economic performance
varied greatly between the two countries. Whereas Spain adapted to the euro
during a period of sustained economic growth, the Italian economy was charac-
terised by high public debt and slow economic growth.4 This helps to explain why
the salience of the EMU issue declined in Spain, while it grew in Italy. Perception
of political and economic European constraints applied not only to opposition
parties in Italy, but also to governmental ones, as they were forced to accept sub-
optimal performances at the domestic level (Cotta, 2005), and made the European
issue relevant for parliamentary discussion.
Using Europe in Domestic Debates
Positive or Negative Usages?
Both countries present a positive conceptualisation of the EU as fostering politi-
cal action or as an incentive for the adoption of certain policies. This is consistent
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with their positive attitude towards European integration. As Figures 2–4 show,
usages of Europe are mainly positive, while we find fairly few negative accounts.
Europe is conceptualised as an opportunity (67 and 63 per cent of interventions in
investiture and budget debates in Spain and 22 and 28 per cent in Italy) rather
than as a constraint (10 and 7 per cent in Spain, 6 and 4 per cent in Italy, respect-
ively). Similarly, Europe is internalised as an incentive for domestic political
action (63 and 46 per cent in Spain, 28 and 30 per cent in Italy) and EU policies
are conceived as a source for legitimising certain policy preferences in both
investiture and budget debates (60 and 50 per cent in Spain, and 34 and 31 per
cent in Italy).
In addition, the evaluation of European policies at the domestic level is
mainly positive (60 and 39 per cent in investiture and budget debates in Spain,
and 22 and 17 per cent in Italy), while negative evaluations are rare. Owing to
the higher importance of Europe in the Spanish case, these usages are higher
than in Italy. Not surprisingly, because of the pro-European position of most pol-
itical parties, negative usages are less relevant. However, a more in-depth analy-
sis qualifies this general picture, showing the increasing relevance of negative,
and especially mixed, accounts of the effects of European policies on domestic
competition. This is true for opposition parties, but, especially in Italy, governing
parties are also starting to criticise some European outcomes and limitations.
Figure 2: Impact and Domestic Action and Reaction to Europe
Notes: The two categories do not total 100 per cent. For clarity in the presentation of the data, ‘mixed’
and ‘no reference’ categories have been omitted. Most of the missing data belong to the ‘no reference’
category. In just two cases (in budget debates – in government in both Italy and Spain) the percentage
of the ‘mixed’ category is over 10 per cent. For impact of Europe, the classification is opportunity or
constraint. Meanwhile, for the usage of domestic action and restriction, the classification is incentive
for action and restriction.
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Government Status and the Perception of European Opportunities
Governmental parties put more emphasis on the opportunities derived from the
EU (90 and 27 per cent in investiture and budget debates in Spain, and 42 and
27 per cent in Italy) and, even more interestingly, no negative perceptions are
Figure 3: Europe as Legitimation
Figure 4: Evaluation of European Policies
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present (Figure 2). This positive position is reinforced by the widespread use of
Europe as a source for legitimising policy decisions. This is especially clear in the
Spanish case (in investiture and budget debates, with 60 and 50 per cent, respect-
ively) and more so in governmental parties (100 per cent of cases in Spain and 51
per cent in Italy in investiture debates); although we can observe an important
difference regarding budget debates (81 per cent in Spain but just 41 per cent
in Italy).
The logic seems clear as governments are part of the European consensus and
discuss and approve all European regulations. Equally, governmental parties
have more information on EU issues, implying a better knowledge of the Euro-
pean process than opposition parties (Raunio, 2002). Consequently, it would be
very difficult to vote for a European law and then reject it at home. This would
imply a lack of credibility both at the domestic level as well as at the European
level. Thus, EU regulations are conceived as positive, fostering domestic action
with legitimating effects. Therefore, opposition to European regulations is mainly
left to opposition parties, which monopolise the negative perceptions of European
outcomes. However, we can observe a significant difference between Spain,
where just a minority of interventions criticise the EU, and Italy, where criticism
is much more evident in both debates. Another interesting aspect is shown by the
positive conceptualisation of Europe by the parties supporting the government in
Spain, especially the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and the Convergència i
Unió (CIU). Does Europe play a role in explaining these parties’ support of the
government? Which parties criticise Europe and in what ways? And, even more
importantly, are negative perceptions of Europe evolving from the politics of
opposition (Sitter, 2002) to parties in government? The next section deals with
these questions.
Party Ideology and Position in the Party System
Regarding Spain, we can observe that all parties analysed, except the United
Left, present positive usages and, furthermore, do not, with few exceptions,
have negative usages. Whether in government, in opposition, or acting as exter-
nal supporters, negative accounts are not present. In the two vote-seeking
parties, Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE),
Europe is used for legitimising their policy options and for stressing the positive
impacts and incentives for action that EU policies imply. Indeed, they do not
present any negative perception of Europe, either in government or in opposi-
tion.5 Equally, CIU and PNV have played an active role acting as external sup-
porters for the socialist and conservative governments.6 The data show the
positive usages of external supporters to the government,7 and indeed, Europe
provided an excellent narrative for justifying their support. In the 1995 budget
debate, when the PSOE was unable to pass the new budget law, the CIU’s
speaker was clear:
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We understand, Mr Minister, and we share your demands for 1996 not to be
a lost year in the process towards the EMU. It is true that on this year
depends, in a good measure, the fact that Spain may be able to join in
1999 the third phase of the monetary union. But, do you really think,
Mr Minister, that you have to remind us of that, of that powerful reason
and against our parliamentary custom . . . we have supported your govern-
ment’s budget during the last two years? (Molins, 1995, p. 9522)
Using similar terms, the PNV justified their support for the first Aznar
government:
Facing this situation, no country that aims to be in the single currency in
1999 can allow to rule without a budget, nor bear the situation of incertitude
that will provoke in the international markets this situation. Even if we con-
sider that this budget law . . . can be improved, we think that political
responsibility and the common good of all the citizens of this state
demands an effort by political forces to give preference to this rather
than partisan or strategic issues. (Zabalia, 1996, p. 1401)
Not only did the impending adoption of the euro foster this external support, but it
also helped to create collusion between parties in their economic policies. In the
words of Rodrigo Rato, then Minister of Economy:
we are all conscious that during the last year an important consensus has
been adopted, an important convergence on political economy positions;
on the one hand, a wide majority of this chamber support European inte-
gration since the process started in 1986 with the single market and then
with the convergence produced by the European Union Treaty. (Rato,
1996, p. 1320)
Or the socialist speaker, Josep Borrell (1996), in the same way claimed that:
‘I would like to be clear with the government that we agree on the macroeco-
nomic objectives of inflation reduction and the deficit you are proposing. They
were also our objectives. They are ambitious and difficult to obtain, but they
are necessary’ (p. 1333).
Therefore, some European policies, especially those that are more in the com-
petence of the EU such as monetary policy, reduce governments’ policy man-
oeuvrability and policy instruments, resulting in a decrease in decidability,
especially with the main opposition party. The consequences are manifold.
First, the reduction of policy options produces less variety in policy proposals
and, as a consequence, a disempowerment of voters (Bartolini, 2005; Mair,
2000). Second, the collusion of mainstream parties leaves opposition to the
EMU to policy-seeking parties, which may, however, play a role in governmental
stability as external supporters (as in 1993, 1996 and 2004). Third, and taking into
account the equally positive interiorisation of European opportunities by the two
leading Spanish ethno-regionalist parties, we can conclude that the EMU’s
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implementation had a consensus-building effect, facilitating otherwise difficult
coalitions.
Who opposes or criticises European policies? In Spain, only the United Left
presents negative and mixed conceptualisations of EU policies. We can observe
how party ideology plays a role in the interiorisation and usages of Europe, with
criticism based on party ideological reasons rather than on opposition to inte-
gration per se. As its leader claimed in the 1996 budget debate:
In other words, what is this debate useful for? Do we have decision powers
after the vote if there are some criteria and deadlines of Maastricht conver-
gence that influence this debate? Are we holding a debate of national sover-
eignty or are we holding the debate on something that comes from outside?
Of course, he who is speaking to you in the name of the federal group, sup-
ports European integration. But, Hon. Members, if the convergence criteria
mark the limits of this debate, the political force I am representing in this
moment does not agree with the content or the instruments that the govern-
ment is handling . . . [w]e do it from an alternative philosophy, from another
view of European integration. (Anguita, 1996, p. 1339)
The Italian case reinforces the idea that government status is important for under-
standing the mainly positive usages of Europe, while opposition depoliticises the
European issue (Mair, 2000). For example, opposition parties do not use Europe
for legitimising their positions in 80 per cent of investiture debates or 78 per cent
of budget ones (Figure 3). However, we can observe a new and different trend
where the Italian case differs from Spain. Whereas in Spain the importance of
the European issue declined once the country joined the euro, in Italy the opposite
is the case: during the period 2002–5 the importance of Europe remained almost
the same as during the crucial years of the euro’s creation (27 and 28 per cent,
respectively, Figure 1). This could be due to the perceived negative consequences
and limitations that the euro implied for Italy’s economic performance. As a con-
sequence, more parties, notably government parties, and even the main party of
the centre-right, presented mixed or clearly negative positions and accounts of
European policies. This is clear in our data, especially regarding budget
debates. As Figure 2 shows, 10 per cent of their interventions in these debates
consider Europe as a restriction for domestic action. In Figure 4, 14 per cent of
their interventions present a mixed evaluation of EU policies, implying a
growing perception of constraints and limitations. Why is this so?
Regarding the two largest parties, we can observe a clear difference between
DS and Forza Italia (FI). The DS, together with the once predominant Democra-
zia Cristiana (DC), has a very positive conceptualisation of Europe, with no
negative references to Europe in either budget or investiture debates. Therefore,
in their evolution from the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the DS seems to have
internalised Europe as an incentive for action and a legitimising factor, which
helps to adopt unpopular decisions, especially for a centre-left party. As Morgan-
do’s (1996) budget debate intervention clearly shows, there is a link between
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Europe and domestic reform: ‘If we want to consolidate our European prospec-
tive, we have to start a period of reforms that reshapes our welfare state’ (p. 4).
Forza Italia has a more ambivalent position due to different factors, such as
the perception of European constraints, their coalition partners (with contrasting
and even very negative European positions), and their role in the implementation
of the euro. The latter is especially relevant. Italy joined the euro under a centre-
left coalition government that claimed this major political success as its own.
However, it was the FI and the centre-right coalition that experienced the
euro’s policy limitations when they gained office in 2001, and their usages
reflect this fact.8 In Gianfranco Conte’s (FI) words:
We do not have to forget that, while we, as a government and as a country,
are trying to follow the commitments adopted in the European Union,
countries economically much stronger than us, such as France and
Germany, have remarkable problems in maintaining the stability pact
and many support that, eventually, something has to be revised. (Conte,
2001, p. 4)
Therefore, the strict measures of the Stability and Growth Pact posed a limitation
on government, implying a more critical vision and a demand to reform it. In
Guido Crosetto’s (FI) words in the 2004 budget debate:
In fact it is undeniable that, after the adoption of the euro, the limits and the
structural weakness of our economic system are now manifest with evi-
dence never seen before. The Italian economy has not the instrument of
competitive devaluation, strongly used in the past, precisely when the com-
petition challenge, often disloyal, of some emerging countries is more
obvious. (Crosetto, 2004, p. 43)
A second interesting aspect concerns the number and type of parties with nega-
tive perceptions of Europe – Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Lega Nord (LN) and
Rifonazione Comunista (RC). The left party, RC, offers a good example of a
negative position towards the EU and how ideology plays an important role in
explaining that position. Since the euro’s introduction, the EU is conceived in
a negative way,9 and they criticise Europe on the same grounds as the Spanish
Izquierda Unida (IU), showing the relevance of ideology and what has been
labelled as the partisan model for explaining positions towards the EU (Bartolini,
2005, p. 321). As their speaker claimed in the 2001 Budget debate:
our amendments to this budget law tend to break down the European Stab-
ility Pact straightjacket, I think, against the proletariat, against the demands
of the society for creating a macroeconomic context favouring a qualified
expansive policy. This is the philosophy of our alternative project. (Russo
Spena, 2001 p. 29)
In the case of the post-fascist AN, the most interesting fact is the way the EU is
constantly neglected. The importance and role of Europe in the AN’s
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interventions is non-existent, with none of the 14 interventions presenting an
assessment of European policies. The ethno-regionalist LN, in turn, offers a
good example of an evolution from functional Europeanism to a soft or even
hard Eurosceptic position (Conti & Verzichelli, 2003). Until the mid-1990s,
LN’s support for Europe and the EMU was based on their idea that only Northern
Italy could fulfil the euro criteria and, hence, a consensual division of Italy should
be possible, with the rich north joining the euro without the south:
It is necessary to save southern Italy and to face the unemployment
problem. Well, the only way to achieve this objective is to make a consen-
sual split-up. In Padania we will use the euro as currency . . . while our
fellow European citizens of southern Italy will use the European single cur-
rency only some years later: beforehand they will have to improve their
economic, productive and financial system. (Pagliarini, 1996, p. 5087)
This idea coincided with the party’s goals, and thus the euro and the necessary
reforms had the LN’s complete support: ‘The best laws approved by the parlia-
ment in recent years have been those that have taken in European directives
and the great opportunities we have missed refer to the missed reception of Euro-
pean principles’ (Pagliarini, 1996, p. 5084). However, once Italy as a country
joined the euro, the incentives for supporting the EU disappeared, and so the
LN did a complete U-turn in their European policy:10
Now the problem, joining the green grassland of the euro, is that of a global
economy which, paradoxically, is in contradiction with an economic
system based on small enterprises, yes, but also on a few big enterprises
that, at least in the domestic market, were the masters; now, even these
enterprises are too small in the global scenario, and the whole mechanism,
on which the fragile Italian economy relied, risks entering into crisis. (Gior-
getti, 1999, pp. 26–27)
Thus, it seems that the domestic consequences of Europe were much more pro-
blematic in the Italian case, especially in economic policy. This was reflected
in the growing politicisation of the EU, not only among the opposition but also
by governmental parties.
Using Europe in Parliament: Some Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the usages of Europe in parliamentary debates shows –
in line with the hypotheses – that the domestic context, notably governmental
crisis and economic performance, is crucial for understanding the importance
and usages of Europe. Hence, we have to take into account that the European
context does not affect all countries or parties in the same way. Governmental
status and position in the party system are also relevant. Parties in government
and the two biggest parties in each country tend to present positive usages of
Europe. Thus, criticism of the EU is left to opposition parties, where ideology
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plays a key role. The analysis has also displayed different indirect impacts of
Europe, such as policy collusion in economic policy or the coalition-building
effect in Spain during EMU’s implementation.
What can we learn from the Spanish and Italian cases? Italy has shown how,
in periods of economic and political crisis, the EU is more politicised. As a con-
sequence, criticism of Europe and its negative impacts and reduction of policy
alternatives was raised not only by the opposition but also by government
parties, thus making the European issue more salient and problematic. For
countries traditionally considered as pro-European who experience a period of
domestic difficulties, especially regarding economic issues, the limitations
posed by EU policies can break down the elite consensus towards integration.
The depoliticisation of the European issue is not a feasible strategy because Euro-
sceptic parties will find arguments that resonate with the mood among the elec-
torate. Additionally, government parties will suffer these limitations while in
office and, hence, growing politicisation and increasing mixed or negative
accounts may also arise among vote-seeking mainstream parties. Initially such
criticism could be limited to certain specific policies, but once the issue is con-
tested it could lead to growing disaffection towards the EU, both at the elite
level and at the mass level. The same logic, but to a different degree and conse-
quence, may apply to more Eurosceptic countries. The negative consequences of
an already contested issue could imply a higher saliency of the EU, a strengthen-
ing of already existing Eurosceptic parties and positions and even a redefinition
of the whole European project and the country’s relation with the EU.
In both cases, however, national interests, opposed to European ones, are
highlighted and the consequences can be manifold. These concluding remarks
show, again, the importance of analysing not only the saliency of the European
issue, but also the way parties (and citizens) internalise and use the European
context in domestic political competition and in different national arenas. A
better knowledge of how the EU and its policies affect each country and how
it is politicised can provide a more insightful understanding of different domestic
political processes with relevant consequences for European integration.
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Notes
1. In the Italian case we need to disentangle the different positions of individual parties that compete
in elections under the same platform but have their own parliamentary groups.
2. The real gross domestic product growth rate shows that in the period 1992–2007, Spanish mean
growth was 3.24 while Italy’s was 1.41. From 1999 to 2007 the mean rate was 3.74 and 1.46 for
Spain and Italy, respectively.
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3. All translations from Italian and Spanish are by the author.
4. Furthermore, monetary policy, limited to inflation control, suited Spanish economic needs but
penalised the Italian need for economic growth with low inflation.
5. The data on parties in government reflect their position, as all Spanish governments have been
single-party governments. Both socialists (1982–96 and 2004–8) and conservatives (1996–
2004) had an absolute majority or just a relative majority of seats.
6. CIU supported the socialist government during the period 1993–95, and CIU and PNV, with other
minor parties, supported the PP government in the 1996–2000 legislature.
7. For example, as external supporters of the government they conceptualise Europe as a positive
impact in investiture and budget debates (86 and 53 per cent, respectively), as an incentive for
domestic action (86 and 67 per cent), or evaluate European policies positively, with 53 per
cent accounts in budget debates (and no negative account) showing their positive stance on the
EMU. As the PP and PSOE, they have almost no negative or mixed perception of the European
impacts.
8. With 3.7 per cent of mixed impacts of Europe, 2.8 per cent of restriction for action and 4.6 per cent
of mixed evaluations.
9. No positive references and 2.8 per cent of impact of Europe as a constraint and restriction for
action and 3.7 per cent of negative evaluations of European policies.
10. For a contrasting view, see Chari, Iltanen, and Kritzinger (2004).
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